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EMU and the ECB
The accord reached at Maastricht in southern
Holland last December moved the European
Community significantly closer to the creation of
a European Monetary Union (EMU) and a com-
mon European Central Bank (ECB). When the
EMU is established, exchange rates among par-
ticipating countries will be permanently fixed,
resulting in essentially a single currency for Eu-
rope, and participating countries will surrender
control of monetary policy to a common Euro-
pean monetary authority.The movement towards
the establishment of a common currency and a
single European central bank represents one of
the most important developments in Western
Europe in the postwar era.
In this Weekly Letter, the proposed stages in the
process leading to monetary union are described,
the nature of the proposed common European
central bank is discussed, and some of the crit-
icisms that have been made of the transition to
monetary union are evaluated.
1989: The Delors Report
The Delors Report in 1989 established the goal of
a European Monetary Union that would include
complete convertibility of all member currencies,
full liberalization and integration of capital mar-
kets, and the permanent fixing of exchange rate
parities. In order to maintain the credibility of
permanently fixed exchange rates, the Report
also envisioned a Europe in which the authority
for the conduct of monetary policy resided not
in the central banks of the individual member
countries, but in a common European central
bank. Without a single monetary policy, member
countries could have different inflation rates. The
combination of fixed nominal exchange rates
and different inflation rates would lead to real
exchange rate movements that would diminish
the relative competitiveness of the countries with
higher than average inflation. Such a situation
would eventually force a realignment ofexchange
rates, so the claim that exchange rates would be
permanently fixed would not be credible.
The transition from a system of separate cur-
rencies and central banks to a single currency
economy was to proceed in gradual stages.
While realignments ofexchange rates would be
allowed during the transition, the maintenance of
fixed exchange rates became an important polit-
ical symbol of each nation's commitment to the
whole process leading to EMU. Only in the final
stage, however, would exchange rates among the
member countries become "irrevocably locked:'
In that stage, monetary policy authority would be
transferred from the national central banks to the
ECB, and member countries would be subject to
constraints on the conduct of fiscal policy, such
as binding limits on budget deficits in the indi-
vidual countries.
This transition process has been criticized for its
emphasis on fixing exchange rates even though
policy convergence would not be achieved until
the final stages of monetary union. Maintenance
of fixed exchange rates in the absence of infla-
tion convergence may require that capital con-
trols be reintroduced. In that case, interest rates
could continue to incorporate a risk premium to
compensate for the eventuality of controls. As a
result, interest rates could differ across countries,
leading to economic inefficiencies (Giovannini
1990; Fratianni, von Hagen/and Waller 1992).
1991: The Maastricht Accord
The agreement reached at Maastricht in Decem-
ber 1991 accepted the Delors Committee's strat-
egy of a gradual approach to monetary union,
but altered the stages by which EMU is to be
achieved. Most importantly, capital and exchange
controls were no longer viewed as acceptable
tools of national policy. In order to prevent the
potential instability that would arise with fixed
exchange rates and no capital controls, the
Maastricht agreement calls for early convergence
by the individual countries in achieving price
stability and fiscal balance, specifically by Jan-
uary 1, 1994. Unlike the strategy outlined in the
Delors Report, therefore, the Maastricht AccordFABSF
envisions the achievement of financial and eco-
nomic integration, including the permanent
elimination of capital controls, before monetary
union is established, with greater convergence
required to ensure exchange rate stability during
the process.
To facilitate the necessary policy coordination,
the Maastricht Accord establishes a new Euro-
pean Monetary Institute designed to coordinate
national monetarypolicies and prepare the way
for the ECB. Finally, the Accord sets a timetable
for monetary union and establishes four require-
ments for countries to enter the union. First, a
country's inflation rate must be no more than 1.5
percentage points above the average rate ofthe
three EC countries with the lowest rates of infla-
tion. Second, its long-term government bond
interest rate must not exceed by more than 2
percentage points the rates of the three lowest
inflation countries. Third, the total government
deficit must be 3 percent or less of GOP. Fourth,
outstanding government debt must be no more
than 60 percent of GOP. These preconditions for
entry require inflation convergence, capital mar-
ket integration, and fiscal budgetary control.
The Maastricht Accord calls for final monetary
union no later than January 1, 1999 and as early
as the end of 1996 if seven EC members (that is,
a majority) have met the entry conditions. Cur-
rently, only Germany, France, Denmark, and
Luxembourg qualify, and the only other country
that seems likely to qualify by 1996 is the Nether-
lands. Consequently, monetary union probably
will be delayed until 1999 and, even then, will
include only a minority of EC countries.
The Accord continues the strategy of the Delors
Report in using exchange rate policy as a signal
of commitment to the EMU and to policies of
price stability. In fact, the current exchange rate
system in the EC has been described as " . ..an
arrangement for France and Italy to purchase
a commitment to low inflation by accepting
German monetary policy" (Giavazzi and
Giovannini, 1989, p. 85).
According to one view, however, this strategy is
both unnecessary and costly. An alternative ap-
proach to monetary union could allow exchange
rates to remain flexible while completing the
process of economic and financial integration,
at which point policy coordination could be
enforced, followed by the complete fixing of
exchange rates. In this scenario, the gains of
economic integration could be realized even if
individual countries were still following incon-
sistent inflation policies. Exchange rates would
be allowed to adjust to reflect differing inflation
rates or regional economic disturbances.
As an example of the costs of making fixed par-
ities a symbol of commitment to the process of
eventual monetary union, EC countries were
forced to raise interest rates in line with the rise
in German interest rates that occurred at the time
of German unification, leading to a widespread
slowdown in economic activity. The alternative
of allowing the OM to appreciate relative to
other European currencies would have helped
to cushion the impact of German unification on
the economies ofthe other European countries.
Some economists have argued that a more satis-
factory way to gain credibility for a low inflation
policy, while not losing the ability to adjust ex-
change rates if necessary during the transition to
EMU, would be to increasethe independence
from political control of the individual national
central banks (Fratianni, von Hagen, and Waller
1992).
This argument is based on the observation that
countries with legally independent central banks
tend, on average, to experience lower inflation
(see Weekly Letter Dec. 13, 1991). Independent
central banks are believed to be less likely to
sacrifice long-term price stability than are elected
governments who might try to use monetary pol-
icy to achieve short-term economic expansions
for political reasons. While a government's deci-
sion to realign its exchange rate might call into
question its commitment to low inflation and
eventual monetary union, such a realignment
made while monetary policy is conducted by an
independent central bank would be less likely
to raise doubts about the commitment to low
inflation.
The Maastricht Accord calls on EC countries to
modify their centra! banking legislation to ensure
their own central banks have a degree of inde-
pendence consistent with that proposed for theECB. This requirement need only be met, how-
ever, by the time complete monetary union
actually begins.
The ECB: Another Bundesbank?
Membership in the EMU requires participating
countries to surrender control over monetary
policy. Once monetary union is established, with
exchange rates of the participating countries per-
manently locked, monetary policy authority will
be vested in the new ECB; countries in the EMU
will no longer be free to set their own monetary
policies. The explicit policy objective of the ECB
is to be price stability, so it is not surprising that
the ECB is being closely modeled on the European
central bank that has been most successful in
achieving low inflation, Germany's Bundesbank.
Like the Bundesbank, the ECB will have an
Executive Board (appointed by the European
Council in consultation with the ECB Council
and the European Parliament) that will carry out
the policy guidelines established by a central
bank Council in which regional interests are rep-
resented. The ECB Council will consist ofthe six
members of the ECB Executive Board plus the
central bank Governors from those countries that
have met the requirements for entry into the EMU.
Fratianni, von Hagen and Waller (1992) argue
that the Governors from the national central
banks will be stronger supporters of price sta-
bility than the members ofthe Executive Board
who will represent EC-wide political interests.
This is similar to the argument that regional Fed-
eral Reserve Bank presidents are more disposed
towards low inflation policy than are members of
the Board of Governors. Tootell (1991), however,
finds no discernable difference in voting behavior
by Federal Reserve Bank Presidents and the Board
of Governors, suggesting that the inclusion of re-
gional representation on the ECB Council may
make little difference.
To maintain the ECB's independence, its statute
says that neither the ECB nor the national central
banks are to take instructions from member gov-
ernments or from EC institutions. Members of the
ECB's Board will be appointed for eight-year non-
renewable terms in order to ensure their political
independence.
Political and legal independence of the ECB is
unlikely to shield its decisions from political
controversy. If individual countries evaluate the
short-run tradeoff between unemployment and
inflation differentiy, there will be conflict over the
policy theECB should follow in the face of eco-
nomic disturbances that have differential impacts
on the nations in the union. The unification of
Germany provides a vivid example in which the
"independent" Bundesbank was forced to accede
to decisions reached by the government that had
monetary implications. Such developments are
likely to test the true independence of the future
ECB and its ability to sustain price stability as the
sole objective of monetary policy.
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